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differentially bias self-rated Big Five personality
traits
Jan Querengässer1 and Sebastian Schindler2,3*Abstract
Background: The Big Five are seen as stable personality traits. This study hypothesized that their measurement via
self-ratings is differentially biased by participants’ emotions. The relationship between habitual emotions and
personality should be mirrored in a patterned influence of emotional states upon personality scores.
Methods: We experimentally induced emotional states and compared baseline Big Five scores of ninety-eight
German participants (67 female; mean age 22.2) to their scores after the induction of happiness or sadness.
Manipulation checks included the induced emotion’s intensity and durability.
Results: The expected differential effect could be detected for neuroticism and extraversion and as a trend for
agreeableness. Post-hoc analyses showed that only sadness led to increased neuroticism and decreased extraversion
scores. Oppositely, happiness did not decrease neuroticism, but there was a trend for an elevation on extraversion
scores.
Conclusion: Results suggest a specific effect of sadness on self-reported personality traits, particularly on neuroticism.
Sadness may trigger different self-concepts in susceptible people, biasing perceived personality. This bias could be
minimised by tracking participants’ emotional states prior to personality measurement.
Keywords: Personality, Assessment, Emotion, Happiness, SadnessBackground
How are you? We regularly enquire about well-being and
intuitively assume that emotional states may guide our
thoughts and behaviour, moderating our personality. Al-
though there are many different definitions of personality,
it is widely accepted that personality traits are “habitual
patterns of behaviour, thought, and emotion” (Kassin
2003, p. 327). As we can see a lot of similarity between
emotional states and personality traits – both influence
the probability of exhibiting certain behaviours – it seems
to be important to examine this relationship in more de-
tail. This study investigates the effect of participants’ emo-
tional states on personality testing.
Today’s most popular framework of personality traits are
the Big Five (Costa and McCrae 1985). The Big Five consist* Correspondence: sebastian.schindler@uni-bielefeld.de
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article, unless otherwise stated.of five personality dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion,
openness for experience, agreeableness and conscientious-
ness. Personality shows a moderate degree of stability over
time (Hampson and Goldberg 2006; Lucas and Donnellan
2011) and even has a genetic basis (Tellegen et al. 1988)
whilst still changing dynamically in relation to life events
conceptually similarly and to the same magnitude as in-
come (Boyce et al. 2013). Though, research shows that Big
Five’s retest reliability is not perfect: A meta-analysis of 848
stability coefficients from different manuals measuring one
or more of the Big Five dimensions reports average coeffi-
cients varying between .69 and .76 (Viswesvaran and Ones
2000). These results indicate that the remaining 42-52%
variance derives from other influencing factors. Some
external factors have already been identified: Namely,
the source of information, for example self ratings ver-
sus ratings by external observers (Allik et al. 2010), and
the interview process, for example a comparison of face-
to-face interviews, telephone interviews and self-ratedBioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
tp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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instability of personality traits within-subject remain. In
Viswesvaran and One’s own words (2000, p. 227): “The
stability of personality traits … [has] been a major source
of consternation for personality psychology.”
The conceptualization of personality suggests that its
testing should not be influenced by temporary moods:
People should respond to how they think and behave in
general rather than how they feel in the current situ-
ation. However, being a systematic but fluctuating source
of measurement variance, it is possible that emotional
states bias response as other personal states (e.g., the ac-
tivation of a certain social role) do (Donahue and Harary
1998). Emotional states should also be considered as a
source of such “patterned” measurement bias, as evi-
dence derived from related areas of study would suggest.
The influence of mood on self-attributes and self-
conception has been studied (Sedikides 1995). In a series
of between-subject experiments, happy, neutral or nega-
tive mood was induced and a significant influence of
mood on self-rated negative and positive behaviours was
found for behaviours which subjects previously rated as
rather unself-descriptive (Sedikides 1995).
Recent affect-cognition theories suggest relationships
between cognition and affect (Forgas 2008). The affect in-
fusion model (AIM, Forgas 1995) states that affective in-
fluence may occur through inferential and memory based
mechanisms depending on the processing style used in a
respective situation (Forgas 2008). Further, affect may in-
fluence the information processing strategy. In doing so,
negative affect can even reduce judgement errors (Forgas
1998, 2008). For example, participants in a negative mood
were more accurate in responding to their partner’s self-
disclosure (Forgas 2011). Therefore, altered information
processing (Forgas 2008) caused by emotions may result
in an altered self-description. As personality assessment
relies overly on self-descriptions, we deduce an effect of
emotional states on personality testing.
Relationships between personality and habitual emotions
Research on habitual emotions acknowledges that indi-
viduals typically differ in how they experience emotions
and that the frequency of emotions varies among people.
In short, habitual emotions dispose of a trait quality,
which makes them appropriate for integration in person-
ality models (Watson and Clark 1992). Empirically, rela-
tionships of discrete habitual emotions or the superior
factors of negative and positive affect with the Big Five
dimensions have been reported. Neuroticism correlates
positively with anxiety and negative affect (Becker 2001;
Clark and Watson 1999; Watson and Clark 1992). Extra-
version correlates positively with happiness and shows a
moderately positive correlation with positive affect (Becker
2001; Clark and Watson 1999; Watson and Clark 1992).Finally, agreeableness correlates negatively with annoy-
ance/anger (Becker 2001). Therefore, at least three of
the Big Five traits are associated with habitual emo-
tional experiences, neuroticism and extraversion in par-
ticular (Becker 2001). Considering that frequent and
intense experience of negative affect is associated with
higher neuroticism, measuring neuroticism during nega-
tive affect may increase scores.
Habitual emotions systematically predict how often and
intensely an individual experiences emotions. Those per-
sonality traits that are strongly associated with habitual
emotions are able to predict emotional experiences as
well. This emotional reactivity has been demonstrated by
various studies (e.g., Hemenover 2003; Smillie et al. 2012).
Goals and hypotheses
We therefore conclude that the underlying pattern of
the relationship between habitual emotion and personal-
ity traits should be mirrored in similarly patterned rela-
tions between emotional states and the measurement of
personality traits. The purpose of this study is to show
that 1) emotional states do have a systematic influence
on personality measurement (not necessarily on person-
ality itself ), that 2) this influence also varies according to
the construct-related similarity between the emotion and
personality dimensions and according to 3) the valence
of the emotion.
Hypothesis 1: Emotional states generally and
differentially alter self-rated personality dimensions
compared to base-line measurements.
Hypothesis 2: This differential effect occurs mainly for
neuroticism, extraversion and agreeableness.
Hypothesis 3: According to the reported relationships
between habitual emotion and personality factors,
sadness as a negative emotion explains the differential
effects on neuroticism and agreeableness, while the
positive emotion happiness explains the effect on
extraversion.
Regarding research on emotional reactivity, neuroti-
cism and extraversion at baseline should also predict
how intense and how long the respectively related emo-
tion was experienced. In sum, we hypothesize that emo-
tional states directly bias personality reporting.
Methods
Participants
From 107 participants, nine (8.4%) were excluded be-
cause of missing values. The remaining 98 participants
were, on average, 22.2 years old (SD = 4.74; min = 14;
max = 49), 70% were psychology students and the
majority were female (67%). Participants gave written
informed consent for participation. This study was
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the University of Bielefeld.Treatment and measurement
All participants attended the experiment twice with a
time lag of about one month (M = 33.7 days, SD = 4.58,
min = 27; max = 44). Treatment was in accordance with
APA ethical standards. At the beginning of the first ses-
sion, each participant provided informed consent prior
to the experiment. Importantly, before responding to the
NEO-FFI at each measurement, participants were asked
to describe their personality in general and as accurately
as possible. Subsequently, all further instructions were
given via computer to avoid instructor effects.Treatment in the emotional condition
At the beginning of this condition the emotion was induced
via a ten minute short film. To provide strong emotions
with an unequivocal valence, we chose happiness as the
positive and sadness as the negative emotion. Subsequently
to the film, participants were asked to imagine happy or
sad scenes from their own personal experience. Music was
played in accordance with the emotion. Additionally, par-
ticipants were asked to focus upon their physical reactions
to the induced emotion, and increase them if possible. Par-
ticipants then had three minutes to adopt the emotion. In
this way we used visual, auditory, proprioceptive and cogni-
tive means to induce the emotion.
As stimuli we chose an excerpt from the film ‘Philadel-
phia’ and Barber’s ‘Adagio pour cordes’ to stimulate the
sad condition. A short report about the fall of the Berlin
Wall including a reunion of a long divided family and
Mozart’s ‘Eine kleine Nachtmusik’ was used for the happy
condition. The same pieces of music were successfully
used to induce emotions by Eich and Metcalfe (1989).
On the last slide of the power-point-presentation, par-
ticipants were informed that the emotional induction
was over and they were given the pen-and-paper part of
the experiment. Before filling out the personality ques-
tionnaire, participants were asked to answer all items as
honestly as possible to avoid biases caused by social de-
sirability. At first, they responded to the item “Right now
I feel very happy/sad”, ranging from 0 (strong disagree)
to 6 (strong agree) as a manipulation check. This was re-
peated in the last item of the questionnaire to indicate
the induced emotion’s durability. The emotion control
items derived from the manipulation check were used as
dependent variables for the correlative replication of
emotional reactivity. The session ended with a debrief-
ing; participants were asked how they felt and, especially
in the sadness-group, we offered the possibility to talk
about what they felt during the experiment.Treatment in the neutral condition
The neutral (or baseline) condition contained a short film
of ten minutes before participants filled out the question-
naire (without the emotion-control items). We decided to
show a film about savants, humans with extraordinary
skills, with the intention not to evoke any emotion. After
the short film, the participants were asked to briefly give
thought to their own strengths and weaknesses to encour-
age them to be more self-alert.
Measurement
The dependent variables were the Big Five personality
scores measured with a German version of the NEO-FFI
(Five factor inventory, Borkenau and Ostendorf 1993;
Costa and McCrae 1992). This questionnaire consists of
60 items, which are summed up as the Big Five personality
factors: Neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience,
agreeableness and conscientiousness (each 12 items). As
the original NEO-FFI only uses a five-point Likert-scale,
we increased measurement sensitivity by using a seven-
point Likert-scale. As this approach was experimental, we
computed the intercorrelations for the five factors of our
sample to check for deviations from the model. As ex-
pected, the results matched those of the NEO-FFI manual:
only the same three intercorrelated. However, our version
revealed even higher intercorrelations (correlation be-
tween neuroticism and extraversion -.33 vs. -.38 in our
sample; agreeableness and extraversion .16 vs. .31; con-
scientiousness and neuroticism -.31 vs. -.41).
Experimental design
Every participant was measured twice. Once in a neutral
condition that served as a baseline measurement and
about one month earlier or later in the emotional condi-
tion. We altered 1) the order of the conditions to avoid
sequence effects, and 2) the sequence of the items (ori-
ginal sequence vs. opposite sequence, beginning with the
original sequence’s last item), to avoid habituation ef-
fects. In sum, the participants were randomly assigned
to 8 subgroups, each a combination of the following
three dichotomous possibilities (see Table 1):
– Induced emotion: A) happiness or B) sadness
– Order of treatment condition: C) firstly emotional
and secondly neutral, D) vice versa
– Sequence of items: E) original sequence of the
questionnaire in the emotional condition and
opposite sequence in the neutral condition,
F) vice versa
Statistical analysis
For the manipulation check of the induced emotions we
performed ordinal Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to com-
pare induction success. To examine shifts in reported
Table 1 Participants’ distribution for combinations of treatment condition, order and sequence of items
Induced emotion A) happiness B) sadness
n 45 53
Order of condition C1 or D2 AC) AD) BC) BD)
n (xC: n = 49; xD: n = 49) 22 23 27 26
Sequence of items E3 or F4 ACE) ACF) ADE) ADF) BCE) BCF) BDE) BDF)
n (xxE: n = 51; xxF: n = 47) 11 11 12 11 14 13 14 12
Notes: 1 first measurement under emotional induction and second in the neutral condition.
2first measurement in the neutral condition and second under emotional induction.
3original sequence of the questionnaire in the emotional condition and opposite sequence in the neutral condition.
4opposite sequence of the questionnaire in the emotional condition and original sequence in the neutral condition.
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First a multivariate 5 × 2 × 2 level repeated measure-
ment ANOVA was performed to test for the global null
hypothesis. Two within-subject factors (personality fac-
tor and treatment condition) and one between-subject
factor (induced emotion) were included. Regarding Hy-
pothesis 1, only the triple interaction was expected to be
significant. If Mauchly’s Tests of Sphericity yielded sig-
nificance, degrees of freedom were corrected according
to Huyn-Feldt as Greenhouse-Geisser ε’s were above
0.75. Eta-squared (η2) was estimated to describe effect
sizes, where η2 = 0.01 describes a small, η2 = 0.06 a
medium and η2 = 0.14 a large effect (Cohen 1988). In the
second step we computed a 2 × 2 level repeated measure-
ment ANOVA for each personality factor with treatment
condition as within and induced emotion as between-
subject factor, again we expected the interaction to be
significant. In the third step, paired-sample t-tests were
computed for every personality factor per induced
emotion combination. Effect sizes and 95% confidence
intervals for paired t-tests were calculated following
Dunlap et al. (1996). Confidence interval of the effect
sizes were calculated with PSY (www.psy.unsw.edu.au/
research/research-tools/psy-statistical-program). Post-hoc
power calculations showed a satisfying probability to
detect reported effects (~73% for the largest reported
effect size). In addition, percentages of participants
with increasing vs. decreasing personality scores dur-
ing treatment were displayed to estimate mean vari-
ability due to the respective mood induction. Finally,
Pearson correlations were calculated between person-
ality traits at baseline and emotional control items.
Randomization check
We controlled goodness of randomization by comparing
the personality scores of the happiness and sadness group
using t-tests for independent samples. The groups differed
neither at baseline, nor after emotion induction (ps > 0.1).
In order to exclude any possible sequence or habituation
biases, we enlarged the 5 × 2 × 2 repeated measurement
ANOVA by adding the two 2-level between-subject factors“order of condition” and “sequence of items”, expecting
neither main effects nor interactions under involvement
for one or both factors. According to this, the computed
model showed no significant main effect as well as no sig-
nificant interaction on every possible combination of the
five factors (ps > 0.1).
Results
Manipulation check
Directly after emotion induction, 85% of the happiness
group members agreed at least somewhat (values ≥ 4 of the
total range of 0–6) to the item: “Right now I feel very
happy” (M = 4.4) and 80% of the sadness group members
agreed at least somewhat to the item: “Right now I feel
very sad” (M = 4.1), with no mean rank differences between
the conditions Z = −0.46, exact p = 0.65. After having filled
out the questionnaire, 52% of the sadness group (M = 3.4)
and 55% of the happiness group (M = 3.7) still agreed to
the same item. Again, no mean rank differences between
the conditions were obtained Z = −0.86, exact p = 0.39.
Descriptives
Table 2 shows the averaged Big Five factor scores per per-
sonality factor, treatment condition and induced emotion.
For a summary of statistical analysis see Figure 1.
Repeated measures ANOVAs
In a first step, the 3-factor-interaction between treat-
ment condition (within), induced emotion (between) and
personality traits (within), tested by a 5 × 2 × 2 level re-
peated measurement ANOVA revealed a highly signifi-
cant result with F(3.71, 356.02) = 6.10, p < .001, η2 = 0.06,
but, as predicted, none of the 2-factor combinations
were significant: 1) treatment condition * induced emo-
tion: F(1, 96) = 0.04, p = 0.85, η2 < 0.01, 2) induced emo-
tion * personality factor: F(3.19, 306.08) = 0.54, p = 0.67,
η2 < 0.01, and 3) treatment condition * personality factor:
F(3.71, 356.02) = 2.34, p = 0.06, η2 = 0.02. In accordance
to the hypothesis, there was also no significant main effect
for treatment condition: F(1, 96) = 0.98, p = 0.32, η2 = 0.01,
and induced emotion: F(1, 96) = 0.72, p = 0.40, η2 < 0.01.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviations of the personality scores per altered Big Five trait,
depending on treatment condition and induced emotion
Treatment
condition
Induced emotion
Trait Sadness (n = 53) Happiness (n= 45)
Neuroticism
Neutral (SD) 31.51 (11.70) 32.51 (12.91)
Emotion (SD) 35.29 (10.63) 31.98 (13.57)
Difference (SD) 3.78 (6.67) −0.53 (6.52)
Extraversion
Neutral (SD) 45.77 (9.97) 44.53 (9.61)
Emotion (SD) 44.41 (10.44) 45.93 (9.06)
Difference (SD) −1.36 (4.59) 1.40 (6.37)
Openness
Neutral (SD) 49.79 (7.11) 52.24 (8.82)
Emotion (SD) 49.28 (8.09) 51.96 (9.54)
Difference (SD) −0.50 (5.27) −0.29 (5.2)
Agreeableness
Neutral (SD) 48.98 (6.85) 48.04 (10.02)
Emotion (SD) 47.81 (7.86) 48.42 (8.26)
Difference (SD) −1.17 (4.24) 0.38 (4.87)
Conscientiousness
Neutral (SD) 45.28 (11.13) 47.11 (9.90)
Emotion (SD) 46.02 (9.28) 47.17 (8.91)
Difference (SD) 0.74 (5.15) 0.05 (4.44)
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.
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ally and differentially alter self-rated personality dimen-
sions compared to base-line measurements.
In a second step 2 × 2 level repeated measurement
ANOVAs were computed for every Big Five factor. Signifi-
cant interactions were shown for the factors neuroticism
with F(1, 96) = 10.39, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.10, and extraversion:
F(1, 96) = 6.19, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.06, as well as a trend-like
interaction on agreeableness: F(1, 96) = 2.83, p = 0.10, η2 =
0.03. The hypothesis, that a differential effect only occurs
for personality dimensions with construct-related similarityFigure 1 Mean differences of personality scores between emotional and
emotion, results of 5 × 2 × 2 ANOVA, post-hoc 2 × 2-ANOVAs and paired
A: triple interaction of 5×2×2-ANOVA with factors personality trait (Big Five) ×
(sadness and happiness). B: interaction of 2×2-ANOVA with factors emotiona
happiness). C: paired-sample t-tests between neutral and emotional conditioto habitual emotions was supported but was only a trend
for agreeableness.
Post-hoc paired t-tests
In a third step, the three previously identified factors were
chosen for post-hoc analyses with paired-sample t-tests
(see Table 3). The hypothesis that emotional valence in ac-
cordance to the reported relationships of habitual emotion
to personality factors shows stronger effects was partially
supported: Negative emotion did result in higher neuroti-
cism scores and a lower score for agreeableness, while theneutral condition dependent on personality factor and induced
-sample t-tests. Notes: *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05; ° = p < .10
emotional condition (neutral and emotional) × induced emotion
l condition (neutral and emotional) × induced emotion (sadness and
n.
Table 3 Results of the post-hoc paired t-tests and percentages of changes between measurements
Big five
factor
Induced
emotion
Post hoc paired t-Tests Differences1
df t SE p d d’s 95% CI n > e e > n
Neuroticism
Sadness 52 4.12 0.92 < 0.01** 0.34 0.18-0.50 32% 66%
Hapiness 44 −0.55 0.97 0.59 −0.19-0.11 47% 47%
Extraversion
Sadness 52 −2.16 0.63 < 0.05* 0.13 0.01-0.26 60% 30%
Hapiness 44 1.48 0.95 0.15 −0.06-0.36 33% 56%
Agreeableness
Sadness 52 −2.01 0.58 0.05* 0.14 0.00-0.33 60% 36%
Hapiness 44 0.52 0.73 0.61 −0.12-0.20 36% 51%
Note. Bold data indicate significant differences at α = .05; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; df = degrees of freedom; t = t-Value; SE = standard error of the mean,
p = p-Value, d = Cohens d; d’s 95% CI = 95% confidence interval for the effect size d; n = neutral condition; e = emotion condition.
1Percentage of participants with increased vs. decreased personality scores during treatment.
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diction to the hypothesis, happiness did not significantly
increase the extraversion score, although sadness did lower
the score. The percentages of participants with a higher
score for a respective personality factor in the neutral or
emotion conditions (see last columns of Table 3) indicate
that changes in self-reported personality scores were not
due to outlier effects. Instead, each effect is based upon
the majority of the participants.Correlation analyses on emotional reactivity
Neither neuroticism nor extraversion at baseline was able
to predict the immediate intensity of the respective emo-
tional experience. In contrast, people scoring high on neur-
oticism tended to display a higher durability of the negative
emotion, as revealed by the second manipulation check
r = .37, p < .01, N = 53, while more extraverted people
tended to maintain happiness r = .30, p < .05, N = 45.Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate if emotional
states have a systematic influence on personality meas-
urement. We hypothesized that such influence differs
depending on the construct similarity between the habit-
ual emotion and personality dimensions – as well as the
valence of the induced emotion. As results show, this as-
sumption was predominantly right. It seems that the
well-known relationships between habitual emotions and
personality traits are reflected in the influence of emo-
tional states on personality measurement. Differential ef-
fects of sadness and happiness could be shown on the
dimensions neuroticism and extraversion and as a trend
for agreeableness. These results are in accordance with
Becker (2001) and Clark and Watson (1999), who both
examined habitual emotions. The post-hoc analysis of
our study attracts attention as it reveals that mainly sad-
ness induction led to these differential results. When
sadness was induced, scores of three personality dimen-
sions differed from their baseline measures.The influence of sadness on personality traits
When sadness was induced, neuroticism went up con-
siderably and extraversion and agreeableness decreased
moderately. Compared to baseline, neuroticism scores
increased for nearly two-thirds (66%) of the participants.
Further, the 95% confidence interval of the effect size did
not include 0.125, indicating a substantial effect (cf. Yarkoni
2012) even though we verified the strong relationship be-
tween negative affect and neuroticism (Becker 2001; Clark
and Watson 1999) as far as the within-person measure-
ment level. A possible explanation for this finding is that
negative affect may trigger negative experiences, which are
linked as a component to elevated neuroticism scores
(Ormel et al. 2012). The AIM model states that partici-
pants may have conferred their actual emotional state onto
their general feelings as well as emotions may have
automatically primed associated ideas or memories
(Forgas 2008). Further, self-reported neuroticism could
also have been influenced by the accommodative, exter-
nally focused reasoning strategy induced by negative
affect (Forgas 2008).
Regarding the large body of research which relates neur-
oticism to mostly negative outcomes, it seems to be in-
creasingly important to assess neuroticism in an unbiased
manner (Cuijpers et al. 2010; Bowen et al. 2012; Ready
et al. 2012). This measurement bias could be minimized by
controlling for influencing emotional states (Viswesvaran
and Ones 2000), which may lead to an even stronger pre-
dictive power for subsequent behaviour.
The nonexistent influence of happiness on personality traits
In the happiness condition, no influence on personality
traits’ measurement was detected - though an increase of
extraversion scores could be descriptively observed. The
first possible explanation is pragmatic: Unfortunately drop-
out participants had all been randomly assigned to the hap-
piness group, resulting in a smaller number of participants.
Alternatively, one could be tempted to argue that the hap-
piness induction was not effective; however, this is not sup-
ported by the emotion control items. As the manipulation
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was high – and even slightly higher in the happiness group
than in the sadness condition. This either indicates that
participants could subjectively accept the happiness induc-
tion better, although it had a weaker impact on personality
scores, or that most participants are happy anyway (Diener
and Diener 1996). Thus, participants’ personality scores at
baseline may not significantly differ after induced happi-
ness as they were happy without explicit induction.
A third explanation for the weaker effect of the happiness
induction refers to Nesse (1990): “Emotional states not only
motivate action, they are also goals that we seek to achieve.
Most human thought, plans, and actions are intended to
induce positive emotions or to avoid negative emotions.”
(Nesse 1990, p. 262). From this evolutionary point of view,
a successful induction of sadness would be more relevant
for participants’ behaviour because sadness indicates a situ-
ation that should be changed, while positive emotions indi-
cate situations that should be maintained (Nesse 1990).
Change is more urgent than maintenance. Hence, we sug-
gest that negative emotions may display stronger effects be-
cause they are largely stimulative and motivational.Possible implications on theory
Using a correlative post-analysis of the emotion-control
items, we tried to replicate emotional reactivity theory.
In accordance with previous research (Hemenover 2003;
Smillie et al. 2012), the neuroticism and extraversion
baseline scores correlated with the change rate of the re-
lated emotion before and after filling out the question-
naire. While people scoring high on neuroticism tend to
display a higher durability of the negative emotion, more
extraverted people tend to maintain happiness.
Of course, the results of our study are only first hints.
Still, they indicate that it could be reasonable to expand the
well-known reactivity model of personality and emotional
experience by a reciprocal element: personality determines
the experience of emotions while emotional states vice
versa impact personality self-ratings. The examination of
how and under which conditions this reciprocity occurs
and if it is moderated by baseline personality traits is sub-
ject to further research.Limitations
We hypothesized that emotional states bias the measure-
ment of personality traits, especially in experimental test
situations. Emotional induction was unsuccessful in only
one in five in the sadness group and one in seven mem-
bers in the happiness group – at least on the conscious
level. Although social desirability bias is possible, intimate
knowledge of our hypotheses and the questionnaire would
have been necessary to fake the Big Five self-ratings in any
intended direction. Furthermore, this would not explainwhy significant effects only occurred after negative mood
induction.
Conclusion
Inducing emotions and examining their influence on
personality research seems to be a very fertile, powerful
and promising approach. In the present study, induced
sadness increased self-reported neuroticism while de-
creasing extraversion. Becoming aware of participants’
emotional state and paying attention to the possible im-
plications on testing could lead to a notable increase in
the stability of assessed personality traits.
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